中国领导人推广“魅力攻势”来强化与亚洲其他国家的外交关系，然而，猜疑依然存在。中国与日本和菲律宾依然困难重重，而中国对于美国在亚太地区定位的模糊观点，也将持续。

在十月二十四至十月二十五日在北京举行的高层工作会议上，习近平主席和其他六位政治局常委及其他高级官员强调，近期的重点放在中国和地区邻国之间的关系上。官方报道指出，习近平主席传达出的会议的主要宗旨是强调中国与其“伙伴及合作者”的关系的重要性。从某种意义上说，这其实并不是新的观点。中国强调“睦邻友好关系”已有多年了。

但无论从习近平讲话的时机、语气，还是会议的议程来说，都显示这出并非例行公事。该会议是在与中国邻国的一系列高层外交互动之后不久召开的。最近的一次是印度总理辛格访华，尽管没有解决边境问题，但至少取得了一些进展。

在九月份于圣彼得堡举行的G20会议间隙，习近平主席走访了四个中亚成员国，还参加了在吉尔吉斯斯坦首都比什凯克举行的上海合作组织峰会。鼓励中国的内陆省份比如新疆和云南，开放并积极参与与其西部国家的合作。

十月份，习近平和李克强都访问了东南亚。习近平参加了在巴厘岛召开的2014年APEC峰会，访问了印尼和马来西亚，而李克强则代表中国参加了在文莱的东亚峰会，并飞往泰国和越南进行访问。这两个领导人都在寻找合作机会。另外，中国领导人还在积极引导多边议程——参与不同地区组织的合作取代了中国过去谨慎的多边主义。例如，习近平提议设立新的以基础设施开发为主的亚洲投资银行。

习近平对APEC的积极态度，部分原因在于中国将是2014年APEC峰会的东道国。在会前，中国通过简要陈述简短地强调地区事务开放和透明的重要性（APEC的风格），来与美国设立的“跨太平洋伙伴关系”（TPP）相对比，这个在亚太地区建立的包含十二个经济体的“高门槛”协议唯独不包括中国。

在李克强总理公开倡导到2015年建立区域全面经济伙伴关系（RCEP）时，跨太平洋伙伴关系组织（TPP）却是在暗处进行，RCEP是一个由东盟和其他六个包括中国在内的亚洲国家参与谈判的另一个合作组织。在今年的中国-东盟博览会上，李克强总理呼吁双方在接下来的“钻石十年”中，应秉承“和睦友好，共同合作”的宗旨，争取在2020年把贸易额扩展到一万亿美元，并将已有十年历史的中国东盟自由贸易协定升级。

通过这一系列的访问和十月的会议，北京流露出与今年一月召开的政治局会议中，习近平所讨论的对外事务不同的声调，那个时候，尽管也在强调合作、开放和双赢，但是中国也同时强调不会放弃自己的应有利益，更不会牺牲自己的国家核心利益。当时这被视为中国对外政策的一个坚决的转折点。而这些特征在近期习近平的领导下有所减弱。

也许现在就下定论说，中国的外交政策会有一个根本的转变为时过早，但是，从这么多年中国与其他海洋国家的岛屿争端上看，中国正在采取一个新的“魅力攻势”策略。

一朝被蛇咬，十年怕井绳

尽管地区反响还没有过多的显露出来，但是魅力攻势至少在两个方面有局限性。首先，东南亚国家对中国的企图十分怀疑，而中国和其他国家的经济发展的不对称性，则加深了这种疑虑。第二，中国所使用的这种魅力攻势并不是对所有的中国邻国都奏效，在日本和菲律宾问题上，这种方法就始终不起作用，海洋争端就是最好的证明。

两个中国的临海国日本和菲律宾现在与美国有着很坚固的外交关系并不是一个巧合。美国在东南亚的参与始终是北京的一个主要担忧，而中国在2010年的外交政策一部分是对美国的亚太再平衡战略的回应，也许这之间有一定的内在联系。

但是近期中国在对美国的外交政策中，却显露出一些“魅力”元素，在习近平和奥巴马于六月探讨的“新型大国关系”之后，中国外交部长王毅在华盛顿的演讲中强调，两国之间应该把通过在东亚的合作作为试验田，来实践这一理论。王毅也重复了他前任的宗旨，不希望美国离开东亚。

魅力攻势是中国对其近年来的地区政策饱受争议的自然反应，但是，如果北京想重新获得睦邻友好关系，那么这种魅力攻势应该继续巩固和保持。

（第一智库网初步翻译，仅供参考）

China""""s leaders are pushing a new """"charm offensive"""" in an effort to strengthen diplomatic ties with their Asian neighbours. However, suspicions persist. Difficulties with Japan and the Philippines and ambiguity over Chinese views of the US role in Asia-Pacific also look set to continue.

Recent Chinese focus on its regional neighbors was highlighted in a high-level working meeting in Beijing on October 24 and 25, chaired by President Xi Jinping and attended by all seven Politburo Standing Committee members and a range of other senior officials. Official reports of the meeting identified Xi""""s main message to be the importance of China""""s relations with its """"friends and partners"""". In one sense, there is nothing new about this. Chinese diplomacy has emphasized """"good neighbourly relations"""" for many years.

But both the timing and the tone of Xi""""s comments, and the profile of the meeting, suggest this is not just a routine bureaucratic exercise. It comes shortly after a series of high-level diplomatic interactions with many of China""""s neighbours. The most recent was the visit to China by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, which made some progress on dealing with – though not resolving – disputed border areas.

On the sidelines of the G20 summit in St Petersburg in September, President Xi Jinping made a long trip to Central Asia, visiting four of the central Asian """"Stans"""" and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Bishkek.

China""""s inland border provinces, such as Xinjiang and Yunnan, have also been encouraged to open up and engage with countries to their west.

In October, both Xi and Premier Li Keqiang travelled to Southeast Asia. Xi attended the APEC summit in Bali, visiting Indonesia and Malaysia, while Li represented the PRC at the East Asian Summit in Brunei and made additional bilateral trips to Thailand and Vietnam. Both leaders sought opportunities for cooperation. They were also proactive in guiding the multilateral agenda – China""""s wariness of multilateralism has been replaced by differentiated engagement across regional institutions. For example, Xi""""s proposal for the establishment of a new Asian investment bank for infrastructure development.

Xi""""s positive approach to APEC is due in part to China taking the APEC chair in 2014. By briefing in advance on the importance of open and transparent regional arrangements (APEC""""s style), the Chinese government used this to contrast with the US approach to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a planned """"high standard"""" agreement among twelve Asian-Pacific economies but which currently does not include China.

The TPP is also behind Li""""s call for the completion by 2015 of negotiations for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), an alternative agreement currently being negotiated by ASEAN and six other Asian countries, including China. Speaking at the annual China-ASEAN trade fair Li called for a """"diamond decade"""" in relations, suggesting a treaty on """"good neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation"""", expanding trade to one trillion US dollars by 2020, and upgrading the decade-old free trade agreement between China and ASEAN.

The Chinese tone on these visits and at the October meeting in Beijing has been effusive, a difference from the first Politburo meeting on foreign affairs chaired by Xi Jinping in January. Back then there was also an emphasis on cooperation, openness and """"win-win development"""" in foreign policy. But it came with a warning that China could not """"abandon its proper interests or sacrifice national core interests"""", a comment which reflected the firmer turn in Chinese foreign policy. This was missing from the public accounts of the latest meeting chaired by Xi.

It would be premature to conclude that there has been a fundamental change in China""""s regional diplomacy. But it does amount to a new """"charm offensive"""", coming after several years of difficult relations with maritime neighbours amidst tensions over the disputed islands.

Once bitten, twice shy

Regional responses are not yet apparent, and this charm offensive will face limitations in at least two areas. First, countries in Southeast Asia are suspicious of China""""s intentions, reinforced by growing economic asymmetry. Secondly, the charm offensive itself does not appear to apply in practice to all of China""""s neighbours. Notably absent from the recent high-level diplomacy have been Japan and the Philippines, where the maritime disputes are most evident.

It is no coincidence that the two Chinese maritime neighbours with which the US currently has the strongest security relationships are Japan and the Philippines. The role of the US in East Asia remains a key concern in Beijing, and the country""""s firmer foreign policy stance in 2010 was partly in response to – or perhaps in dialectic relation with – the US """"rebalancing"""" to the Asia-Pacific.

And yet there are elements of """"charm"""" in China""""s recent diplomacy towards the US. Following discussion of a """"new type of major country relationship"""" between Xi and President Obama in June, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a speech in Washington DC that the two countries should work together to make East Asia an """"experimental field"""" in developing this concept. Wang also repeated a line used by his predecessors, saying that China did not want the US to leave East Asia.

A """"charm offensive"""" represents a natural response to the criticisms of China""""s regional policy over recent years. But it will need to be substantial and sustained if Beijing is to make significant strides in regaining neighbourly goodwill.

原文链接：http://www.chathamhouse.org/media/comment/view/195157